Mission incomplete the U.S. Army's unsuccessful implementation of stability operations in Iraq by Kosters, Daniel L.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2011-06
Mission incomplete the U.S. Army's unsuccessful
implementation of stability operations in Iraq
Kosters, Daniel L.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
MISSION INCOMPLETE: THE U.S. ARMY’S UNSUCCESSFUL 








 Thesis Advisor: Kenneth R. Dombroski 
 Second Reader: James A. Russell 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
June 2011 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Mission Incomplete: The U.S. Army’s Unsuccessful 
Implementation of Stability Operations in Iraq 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S) Daniel L. Kosters 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER   
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
  AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number _______N/A_______.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
The United States Army has struggled to implement the stability operations doctrine of its counterinsurgency strategy 
in Iraq. Despite the emphasis in national strategic guidance documents and written Army field manuals, stability 
operations continue to evade the Army as a major priority. This thesis seeks to answer: Why has the Army, as an 
organization, had such a difficult time implementing stability operations? Additionally, this thesis attempts to 
determine whether the Army made its best attempt to implement stability operations in Iraq between 2003 and 2007. 
Chapter II reviews the Army’s history and its struggle to acknowledge irregular conflicts as important as conventional 
war. Chapter III then evaluates stability operations implementation in Iraq between 2003 and 2007 in a case study. 
Finally, Chapter IV concludes with recommendations for the organization in implementing stability operations in the 
future. 
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Stability operations, doctrine, counterinsurgency, Iraq, Army, organization, 
implementation 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
73 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
MISSION INCOMPLETE: THE U.S. ARMY’S UNSUCCESSFUL 
IMPLEMENTATION OF STABILITY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 
 
 
Daniel L. Kosters 
Captain, United States Army 
B.S., Western Michigan University, 2004 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 


























Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD 
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v 
ABSTRACT 
The United States Army has struggled to implement the stability operations doctrine of 
its counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq. Despite the emphasis in national strategic guidance 
documents and written Army field manuals, stability operations continue to evade the 
Army as a major priority. This thesis seeks to answer: Why has the Army, as an 
organization, had such a difficult time implementing stability operations? Additionally, 
this thesis attempts to determine whether the Army made its best attempt to implement 
stability operations in Iraq between 2003 and 2007. Chapter II reviews the Army’s 
history and its struggle to acknowledge irregular conflicts as important as conventional 
war. Chapter III then evaluates stability operations implementation in Iraq between 2003 
and 2007 in a case study. Finally, Chapter IV concludes with recommendations for the 
organization in implementing stability operations in the future. 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION................................................................1 
B. IMPORTANCE ................................................................................................3 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................4 
D. HYPOTHESIS................................................................................................12 
E. METHOD AND SOURCES ..........................................................................13 
F. OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................14 
II. THE U.S. ARMY AND A HISTORY OF ABBERATIONS: NEGLECTING 
IRREGULAR WAR ..................................................................................................15 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................15 
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF “REAL WAR” AND ABBERATIONS .........16 
1. Real War: Conventional Campaigns ...............................................18 
a. World War II ...........................................................................18 
b. The Cold War ..........................................................................19 
c. Desert Storm ............................................................................20 
d. A Taxonomy of Success? ........................................................21 
2. Aberrations: Irregular Conflicts ......................................................22 
a. Korean War .............................................................................22 
b. Vietnam War ...........................................................................23 
c. Somalia ....................................................................................25 
d. A Taxonomy of Failure?.........................................................25 
C. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................26 
III. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 2003–2007: THE EVIDENCE OF 
FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT STABILITY OPERATIONS ................................29 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................29 
1. Why Iraq? ...........................................................................................29 
B. TEST: A FAILURE TO ANTICIPATE? ....................................................30 
1. Anticipating the Correct Ground Conditions .................................31 
2. Anticipating Troop Requirements....................................................32 
3. Anticipating Prison Requirements ...................................................33 
4. Anticipating a Common Way of War ..............................................34 
5. Results .................................................................................................35 
C. TEST: A FAILURE TO LEARN? ...............................................................35 
1. Learning to Focus on the Population ...............................................36 
2. Learning New Tactics Between Deployments .................................37 
3. Learning To Use Money as a Weapon System ................................38 
4.  Results .................................................................................................40 
D.  TEST: A FAILURE TO ADAPT?................................................................40 
1.  Adapting to New Nonlethal Tactics ..................................................41 
2.  Adapting New Standard Measures of Effectiveness .......................42 
3. Adapting Personnel to Stability Operations ....................................43 
 viii 
4.  Results .................................................................................................45 
E.  FINDINGS ......................................................................................................45 
IV. CONCLUSION: EMBRACING STABILITY OPERATIONS.............................47 
A. REVIEW OF FINDINGS ..............................................................................47 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ORGANIZATION ..........................48 
1.  Anticipate More Than Just Conventional War ..............................48 
2.  Improve Organizational Learning ...................................................49 
3. Continue to Adapt ..............................................................................50 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH.............................50 
D.  FINAL THOUGHTS .....................................................................................51 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................53 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................57 
 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Characteristics of Conventional and Irregular War. ........................................17 
Figure 2. Evaluation of U.S. Army Experience With Conventional War Vs.  
Irregular Conflict, 1941–2003. ........................................................................27 
Figure 3. Evaluation of Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2003–2007 and Stability 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
QDR   Quadrennial Defense Review 
NMS   National Military Strategy 
NSS   National Security Strategy 
NDS   National Defense Strategy 
DoD   Department of Defense 
DoS   Department of State 
PDD 25  Presidential Decision Directive 25 
USAID  United States Agency for International Development 
UN   United Nations 
NGO   Non-Governmental Organization 
GAO   Government Accountability Office 
DoDI   Department of Defense Instruction 
DoDD   Department of Defense Directive 
ROAD   Reorganization Objective Army Division 
IDF   Israeli Defense Force 
OIF   Operation Iraqi Freedom 
ASW   Antisubmarine Warfare 
COIN   Counterinsurgency 
CJTF   Combined Joint Task Force 
FOB   Forward Operating Base 
IED   Improvised Explosive Device 
CALL   Center for Army Lessons Learned 
CGSC   Command and General Staff College 
 xii 
CERP   Commanders Emergency Response Program 
FM   Field Manual 
ACR   Armored Cavalry Regiment 
CAST   Conflict Assessment System Tool 
CA   Civil Affairs 
CMO   Civil Military Operations 
KO   Contracting Officer 
PPO   Project Purchasing Officer 





 I would like to first thank Doctor Kenneth Dombroski for his commitment to 
helping me complete this project. His expertise and insight were critical in the completion 
of this work. Without his guidance and mentorship I would not have been able to 
complete this research. Additionally, I would like to thank Doctor James Russell for his 
enthusiasm, mentorship and feedback while completing this project.  
 I have to thank my loving wife, Stacey, and daughter, Alexis, for their support and 
sacrifice while I spent many hours away from our family working on this project. 
Without Stacey’s commitment to our family, I would be unable to pursue my individual 
goals and interests. 
 Finally, I dedicate this work to PFC Scott Messer, U.S. Army, who gave his life in 
the service of our country.  
 xiv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The story of the Iraq war is not over…But it is, already, a reminder that 
the most powerful and competent military the world has ever known can 
still stumble, and stumble badly...1  
~ Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, 2006 
The United States Army has been engaged in post-war Iraq for eight years and has 
struggled to transition from the conventional warfare it masters to the counterinsurgency 
fight it avoids. As the primary ground force in the Department of Defense, the Army has 
found itself having to place increased emphasis on the stability operations component of 
its counterinsurgency doctrine—something it seeks to steer clear of. The 2006 Army 
Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency states: “A counterinsurgency campaign is … a 
mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations conducted along multiple lines of 
operations.”2 Offense, defense, and stability operations are considered to be equally 
important throughout the Army organization ranging from the strategic level commanders 
down to the operational and tactical level soldiers.3 The Army admits that, “no single 
element [defense, offense, stability] is more important than the other is; simultaneous 
combinations of the elements, constantly adapted to the dynamic conditions of the 
operational environment, are key to successful operations.”4 Over the past eight years, 
however, evidence suggests that the Army has not placed enough emphasis on the 
stability operations component. Two years after Operation Iraqi Freedom was underway,  
 
                                                 
1 Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: The 
Free Press, 2006), 251. 
2 General David Petreaus and General James Amos state this in the forward of the U.S. Army’s Field 
Manual, 3-24 Counterinsurgency (December 2006). 
3 United States Army Headquarters, Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations (Washington, DC: 
United States Department of the Army, 2008), 2-2. 
4 Ibid., 2-2. 
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strategic-level documents had just started addressing this issue. It was four years into the 
conflict before the Army truly began to acknowledge a need to change and innovate the 
way it was operating in Iraq. 
In May of 2003, President George Bush declared the end of major combat 
operations in Iraq. However, the president would likely have increased the prospects for a 
successful mission if he had declared the end of conventional war and the beginning of 
stability operations. It would not be until 2005 when a directive from the Pentagon would 
push the Army organization in the right direction. That year, the Department of Defense 
issued Directive 3000.05 stressing, “Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission 
that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given 
priority comparable to combat operations…”5 Several directive documents—The 2006 Army 
Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, followed by the 2008 Army Field Manual 3-07 
Stability Operations, and another Department of Defense Instruction in 2009—repeatedly 
stressed the importance of the Army’s need to implement stability operations throughout the 
organization.6  Other, more recent, strategic-level documents, such as the 2008 National 
Defense Strategy, 2010 National Security Strategy, and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense 
Review, have also stressed the growing importance of the military’s implementation of 
stability operations.7   
Despite the emphasis placed on stability operations in the strategic guidance and 
written Army field manuals, stability operations seem to evade the Army organization as 
a major priority. Why then has the Army, as an organization, had such a difficult time 
implementing stability operations? Further, when looking at Operation Iraqi Freedom,  
 
 
                                                 
5 United States Department of Defense, Department of Defense Direction 3000.05: Stability 
Operations (Washington, DC, November 2005). 
6 United States Army Headquarters, Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency (2006), Field Manual 3-07 
Stability Operations (2008) and Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05 (2005) each explain the 
importance of stability operations for the United States Army.  
7 Barack Obama, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC, 2010); U.S. Department of Defense, 
Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC, Feb. 2010); U.S. Department of Defense, National 
Defense Strategy (Washington, DC, Jun. 2008).  
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there is a question about whether the Army actually made its best attempt to implement 
stability operations, and if not, are there current practices and attitudes preventing their 
best possible implementation? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The importance of the question posed in this thesis is threefold. First, without 
successful stability operations, the balance that is so crucial to counterinsurgency is not 
achieved. When dealing with an insurgency, winning over the population becomes the 
goal. Without stability operations doctrine playing its part in counterinsurgency strategy, 
the Army is simply conducting offensive and defensive operations. Stability operations 
deal quite closely with the population in that: 
Stability operations leverage the coercive and constructive capabilities of 
the military force to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate 
reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish political, 
legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of 
responsibility to a legitimate civil authority.8 
Second, most of the countries in the Middle East suffer from similar problems. 
They have a poor civil service infrastructure, weak governance system, high 
unemployment, and are lacking in civil services—among others. Stability operations can 
assist in winning over the population while seeking to “establish security, establish civil 
control, restore essential services, provide support to governance, and provide support to 
economic and infrastructure development.”9 If the United States is to get involved in 
another one of these countries within the region in the future, stability operations could 
become very important.  
Third, the U.S. government agency most likely to execute stability operations is 
the Army; however, the organization lacks the current expertise and capability that are 
required for successful implementation of stability operations. The State Department, on 
the other hand, does have the capability, but, it has a limited capacity because it has fewer 
                                                 
8 United States Army Headquarters, Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations (Washington, DC: 
United States Department of the Army, 2008), 2-2. 
9 Ibid., 2-5. 
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employees, as compared to the military, operating in places like Iraq. As of November 
2010, the State Department has roughly 1,000 employees working in Iraq compared to 
the nearly 50,000 the military has there.10 The Army has a greater capacity to reach the 
rural Iraqi population, but without a stability operations focus, it is not best utilizing its 
assets to win over the population.  
If there are reasons for the Army’s failure to implement the stability operations 
doctrine, these reasons need to be uncovered and corrected. Stability operations are 
irregular and have therefore not been strongly emphasized among general purpose forces, 
which train to fight conventionally. Lawrence Yates writes that, “As America’s military 
experience readily demonstrates, combat troops are generally required to perform a 
variety of unorthodox and nonmilitary tasks in stability operations. Doctrine needs to 
delineate these nontraditional roles so that combat units can better plan and train for 
them.”11  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Scholars and theorists provide numerous reasons for military organizational 
failure. Many compelling theories point to the inability or unwillingness of military 
organizations to change and/or innovate. These theories become particularly important 
when we look at Operation Iraqi Freedom and the failure of the Army to put stability 
operations into practice. Stability operations were an innovation that the Army 
organization just could not seem to adjust to. 
An initial contributor to discussions on organizational theory is Max Weber. He 
observed that bureaucracies, or organizations, sustain themselves and are by nature slow 
to change.12 He argued that bureaucracies are oriented toward “routine, repetitive, 
                                                 
10Andi Medici, “State Department Ramps Up as Military Winds Down,” Federal Times.com, October 
19, 2010. This source reports that 1,085 Department of State officials were operating in Iraq; A statement 
from the White House from the Office of the Press Secretary explained on August 2, 2010, that there would 
be 50,000 troops in Iraq operating after August 31, 2010.  
11 Lawrence A. Yates, “The U.S. Military Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005,” Global 
War on Terror Occasional Paper 15 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 36. 
12 Max Weber as described by Stephen Posen in Winning the Next War (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1991), 4.  
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orderly action.”13 Many scholars since Weber, including recent theorists such as Barry 
Posen, Deborah Avant, Stephen Rosen, and Theo Farrell, all have written about military 
organizations and change.14  Several contending theories were organized into four 
categories in an article in 2006 by Adam Grissom: the civilian intervention school, the 
inter-service school, the intra-service school, and the cultural school.15  Each school 
provides its own explanation for what causes military organizations to innovate or 
change. In my analysis, I add two additional schools: the “structuralist” and “behaviorist” 
schools. 
The first school of thought, represented by Barry Posen, argues that military 
organizations change the way they do business when civilian leaders interject. In his 
book, The Sources of Military Doctrine, he argues that the German Blitzkrieg, the French 
Defensive Posture, and the creation of the British Royal Air Force were all innovations 
the military was able to adjust to because of civilian intervention.16  Posen concludes 
that, no matter what, civilian intervention is what influences change in military 
doctrine.17 He writes, “Civilians must carefully audit the doctrines of their military 
organizations to ensure that they stress the appropriate type of military operations”18 
Essentially, Posen believes that the military organization cannot change by itself, but 
rather, it requires an outsider to motivate the organization into change. 
Deborah Avant, another scholar of the civilian interventionist school, agrees that 
civilians contribute to helping the military change, but she says both organizational 
theory and balance of power theory (which Posen argues) are not sufficient explanation 
for that change.19  Avant says that institutional theory provides a better explanation. She 
                                                 
13 Stephen Rosen, Winning the Next War, 4. 
14 Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Deborah 
Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). Theo Farrell and 
Terry Terriff, The Sources of Military Change (London: Lynne Reinters Publishers, 2002); and Stephen 
Rosen, Winning the Next War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
15 Adam Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 905–934. 
16 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 44. 
17 Ibid., 239. 
18 Ibid., 241. 
19 Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change, 5. 
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argues that “institutionally conditioned civilian choices as to the setting up and 
monitoring of military organizations affect the strategic relationship between civilians 
and military organizations over time.”20 She compares the British civil-military relations 
institution to that of the American civil-military relations institution and concludes that 
the British model responded better to civilian goals because there was incentive for the 
civilians to work with the military organization.21 U.S. civilian leaders, on the other 
hand, had opposing views on supporting the military during the Vietnam War, which 
made it more difficult for the military organization to change.22  She writes that “divided 
civilian institutions in the U.S. caused there to be focus on budgets to control the 
military.”23  Although Avant uses institutional theory to explain civil-military relations 
regarding military innovation, she still agrees with Barry Posen that, ultimately, civilian 
intervention influences military change, but she contends that institutional relationships 
are what effect that civilian intervention.  
The second school of thought on military doctrine and change focuses on the 
rivalry relationship between the services. It states that “the core contention … is that 
resource scarcity [between the services] is the key catalyst for innovation.”24 Douglas 
Campbell argues that the U.S. Air Force sought to develop close air support capability to 
aid troops on the ground in order to compete with the U.S. Army and its rotary wing 
capability.25 Campbell argues that it was the competition with the Army that led to the 
U.S. Air Force development of the A-10 Warthog which was to be used in close air 
support of ground troops.26 The inter-service rivalry theory concludes that the services 
compete against one another and in the process they change. 
                                                 
20 Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change, 9. 
21 Ibid., 130–131. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 131. 
24 Adam Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” 910. 
25 Adam Grissom references Douglas Campbell, the author of Warthog and the Close Air Support 
Debate in: “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” 913. 
26 Ibid., 913.  
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The third school of thought dealing with military doctrine and change emphasizes 
that intra-service rivalry pushes members within a military organization to compete with 
one another and that drives change. Stephen P. Rosen uses this argument to explain that 
this occurs when senior leadership develops a new way of winning.27  For example, when 
a senior leader develops a new tactic or new standard operating procedure that has proven 
effective (what Rosen describes as the “way of winning”), he or she will use incentives to 
motivate junior officers to follow him or her. Rosen says that a struggle over ideas ensues 
within the organization usually between senior officers that attempt to capture mid-level 
officers, seeking promotion and professional opportunities.28  He argues that mid-level 
officers are more likely to follow the senior leader’s innovative way of winning in order 
to improve chances to be promoted or be offered professional opportunities over others.29 
This competition between senior military leaders within the service organization drives 
innovation and change to military doctrine.  
The fourth school of thought, represented by Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, 
argues that “culture is a major causal factor in military innovation,” and that “culture sets 
the context for military innovation, fundamentally shaping organizations’ reactions.”30 
They argue that “cultural norms, politics and strategy, and new technology” are the 
sources for change in a military organization.31  According to their argument, their first 
source, cultural norms, “produce persistent patterns peculiar to these communities, such 
as national strategic styles and organizational ways of warfare.”32 Second, they argue that 
new technology often plays a part in that “elites may oppose a new technology that they 
consider to be impractical (even fantastical) or threatening to existing organizational 
routines and structures.”33 Third, they argue that “the most obvious source of military 
                                                 
27 Stephen Rosen, Winning the Next War, 20. 
28 Ibid., 251. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Grissom references Theo Farrell in “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” 916. 
31 Farrell and Terriff, The Sources of Military Change, 6. 
32 Ibid., 7. 
33 Ibid., 13. 
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change is strategic, that is, a changing threat to national security.”34 They contend that a 
change in national strategy influences how military organizations adjust to meet that 
threat. Ultimately, Farrell and Terriff say that military change is complex and “comes 
from various sources, all of which must be given consideration.”35  
Although Adam Grissom clearly identifies four key schools of thought, there are 
some scholars who tend to argue that change in military organizations is difficult because 
they aren’t designed correctly to meet threats they face. Two particular authors, Robert 
Perito and Douglas Macgregor, seem to take this point of view. These authors could be 
categorized into a fifth school of thought. I refer to them as “structuralists.”  These 
“structuralists” make the argument that one cannot expect a military organization to 
change the way it fights without first reorganizing it into a force that can best counter the 
threat. Both Perito and Macgregor offer suggestions on how the military ought to 
reorganize its structure in order to meet new challenges. Perito argues that the military 
needs to develop a constabulary force—consisting of both civilian and military 
components—that can perform law enforcement functions in a post-conflict 
environment.36  Perito believes that military police forces are best equipped to deal with 
stability operations because they would be able to provide judicial and penal experts 
acting in alignment with law enforcement officers, who would be using military Stryker 
vehicles.37 (Although his argument opens up the discussion for what an operational and 
tactical force might look like, his organization might struggle to meet other various 
economic requirements that come with stability operations.)38  
Macgregor argues that, like the Roman Legions designing tactics to defeat the 
Greek phalanx in 200 B.C., there is a need for structural innovation in the way the U.S. 
Army fights.39 He contends that the role of land power doctrine, not airpower or sea 
                                                 
34 Farrell and Terriff, The Sources of Military Change, 10. 
35 Ibid., 17. 
36 Robert Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?: America’s Search for a Post-
conflict Constabulary Force (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2004), 328. 
37 Ibid., 330–335. 
38 Ibid., 335. 
39 Douglas Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 1. 
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power doctrines, will have greater demand on the future and that a new force must be 
configured to be “a self-contained, mobile armed force that can deploy on a phone call to 
defend American interests.”40 He argues that operations like Bosnia and Somalia in the 
1990s paved the way for a need to implement new doctrine.41  He also argues that the 
Army needs to change from a divisional structure to a brigade structure if it wishes to 
succeed in taking on missions similar to Bosnia and Somalia in the future. 
“Organizational change … will assist with the creation of the capability in the Army’s 
ground forces to cope with more cunning and dangerous enemies in the strategic 
environment of the future,” Macgregor writes.42  Perito and Macgregor make compelling 
arguments for changing the military structure in order to meet challenges that might 
require stability operations. 
A sixth category of scholars also exists that I deem “behaviorists.” These scholars, 
including Brian Linn, Eliot Cohen (with John Gooch) and James Russell, argue that it is 
solely the behavior of the organization that best explains why military organizations do or 
do not change. Brian Linn argues that throughout history, the Army has had three types 
of traditions (or organizational personalities), and these have steered the Army into 
certain directions that have influenced what doctrine should be followed.43  He argues 
that these traditions, which he calls Guardians, Heroes, and Managers, have been what 
influenced how the Army chose to fight its previous wars.44 The Guardians generally 
follow a defensive doctrine.45 Whether it was the design of harbor fortifications 
following the War of 1812 or the implementation of the Powell Doctrine which required 
strict preconditions before sending the Army to war, Brian Linn argues that the Guardian 
tradition is still there.46  The Heroes tend to follow a more assertive doctrine. They are 
                                                 
40 Douglas Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 227. 
41 Ibid., 22. 
42 Ibid., 176. 
43 Brian Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2007), 5. 
44 Ibid., 5. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 6. 
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much more emotional and “believe that wars are fought with men, not weapons.”47 
Examples of Heroes would be George Patton in World War II or Tommy Franks of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.48 The Managers are focused on effectiveness and efficiency of 
the organization.49  Linn gives the example of General Erik Shinseki as a Manager who 
identified the need for more troops in the pre-invasion planning of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, but who was weak at inspiring others to see his prediction as important.50  
Linn’s overarching argument is that these three traditions dominate the force and it is the 
particular tradition dominant in the organization that determines the type of doctrine that 
is advocated.  
James Russell argues that tactical adaptation and organizational innovation are 
related. He states that “Tactical adaptation occurs when units change organizational 
procedures on the battlefield in order to address perceived organizational shortfalls, 
which are generally revealed by their interaction with the adversary.”51 Russell argues 
that lower echelon elements of the military organization at the brigade level and company 
level were innovating even while new counterinsurgency doctrine was being developed 
in Iraq. Although he agrees that top-down innovation is important, he believes that the 
bottom-up approach is equally, if not more, important. His 2011 book, Innovation, 
Transformation, and War argues that in cases such as the Ninewa and Anbar provinces of 
Iraq between 2005 and 2007 innovation occurred within the organization at lower 
echelons of command while upper echelons at the strategic level were still developing 
new written doctrine.52 Unlike Linn and Cohen, Russell’s approach points out the 
importance of the lower echelon of command and essentially says that, in Iraq, the 
military organization adapted to the situation on the ground even while there was 
                                                 
47 Brian Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2007), 6. 
48 Ibid., 6–7. 
49 Ibid., 6. 
50 Ibid., 239. 
51 James Russell, Innovation, Transformation and War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 
191. 
52 Ibid., 33–39. 
 11 
confusing strategic guidance. It was the flexibility of the low-level tactical leadership that 
helped institute change within the organization. From this perspective, Russell’s insight 
on the lower echelons of the military organization and its adaptation on the battlefield in 
Iraq is both necessary and relevant to the discussion on organizational change.  
Cohen and Gooch argue that the military organization changes after it fails in 
battle.53 They argue that military organizations are compelled to change once they fail to 
learn, fail to anticipate and fail to adapt in war.54  They argue that between 1940 and 
1942 the U.S. Navy failed to learn from previous World War I German U-boat attacks 
along the U.S. coast, but that after this failure, the Navy adapted by adding the Tenth 
Fleet in 1943, which focused heavily on Anti-submarine warfare.55 Their argument is 
oriented around the behavior of the military organization changing after conflict gets 
underway. Unlike Linn, who focuses on three types of personalities within the Army, 
Cohen and Gooch argue that it is the actual actionable (or lack of actionable) behavior 
that best explains what leads an organization to fail. They explain, “The view that 
ascribes all fault or praise to a commander is the equivalent of concentrating only on 
operator error when highly complicated machines malfunction.”56 To Cohen and Gooch, 
the organization is too complex to pinpoint any one reason for failure, but rather, they 
contend that all variables must be considered. Leadership matters, but it is not the only 
factor that contributes to the systemic failure of a military organization. 
Each of these six schools of thought brings something to bear in the discussion of 
organizational failure. However, the “military behaviorist” school of thought makes the 
most compelling argument in trying to analyze why the Army has struggled to internalize 
stability operations within the organization. Since the U.S. Army, like many armies in 
history, has suffered from organizational resistance to change it seems best to determine 
what behaviors may have contributed to that resistance by looking at what actions the 
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organization did or did not take. Although scholars, like Posen, Rosen, Avant, Farrell, 
Terriff, Macgregor, Perito, Campbell, Russell, and Linn provide necessary and 
compelling arguments about organizational change, only Cohen and Gooch provide a 
solid structural and behavioral framework for testing the Army organization and its 
implementation of stability operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom between 2003 and 
2007—to determine if the Army failed to anticipate, learn, and adapt. 
D. HYPOTHESIS 
The United States Army struggled to acknowledge that it was entering into a 
stability operations phase in Iraq following the end of major combat operations in 2003. 
Further, it struggled to recognize that stability operations were essential to the Iraq 
mission until “the surge” was implemented in 2007. A lack of organizational emphasis on 
stability operations seems to have caused the Army to fumble through its first years of the 
occupation in Iraq. The struggle to implement stability operations could be due to the 
organization’s inability to anticipate, learn, and adapt to the irregular mission it has often 
seen as an aberration throughout its history.57 Cohen and Gooch describe these three 
components of an organization’s behavior by arguing, from within the context of their 
well-supported theory that militaries often fail because they do not anticipate, do not 
learn, and do not adapt to the situations they enter into.58 
Throughout history, in an attempt to avoid facing their own shortcomings, 
military organizations have been known to blame their follies on individuals. Following 
the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, for example, Admiral Husband Kimmel and 
Lieutenant General Walter Short, commanders of the U.S. Naval forces and U.S. Army 
forces in Hawaii were relieved of their commands and took the fall for the military 
organizations they led. However, as Cohen and Gooch write, “true military 
‘misfortunes’—as we define them—can never be justly laid at the door of any one 
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commander. They are failures of the organization, not the individual.”59  Cohen and 
Gooch say Pearl Harbor was a “failure of vulnerabilities and an absence of precautions—
an operational failure.”60 Although individual leaders are important in militaries, 
according to Cohen and Gooch, it is the organizations’ practices, or lack thereof, that can 
lead to failures to anticipate, learn, and adapt. 
When looking at Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Army’s implementation of 
stability operations, it was the military organization’s practices, not its leaders, that most 
contributed to the stalemate in operations between 2003 and 2007. The Army’s failure to 
anticipate the irregular conflict that took place, its struggle to learn, and its slow 
operational adaptation—each played a key role in the Army’s fumble with stability 
operations. In the case of OIF, the Army was inept at using innovation to transition from 
its traditional way of war to a way of war in the form of stability operations as the battle 
unfolded—and this led the organization down the path of failure. 
E. METHOD AND SOURCES 
My methodology for this thesis will be to conduct a qualitative analysis of a 
single historical case study of the Army in executing stability operations during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom between 2003 and 2007. This study will attempt to determine 
what factors contributed to the struggle the Army, as an organization, had in 
implementing stability operations throughout the force before, during, and even after 
operations. Cohen and Gooch’s framework will be used to evaluate the Army’s difficulty 
in implementing stability operations.61 Their “Taxonomy of Misfortune” framework 
describes three reasons why military organizations fail—a failure to learn, failure to 
anticipate, and failure to adapt.62 They contend that more than one failure leads to an 
“aggregate failure” and all three types of failure, when combined, equal a 
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“catastrophe.”63  A test will be done to see if all three of these components contributed to 
the Army’s failure to implement its stability operations doctrine in Iraq between 2003 and 
2007. 
Primary sources for this study will come from the strategic, operational and 
tactical levels of the military and civilian sectors using documents such as Department of 
Defense reports, U.S. State Department reports, Government Accountability Office 
reports, current U.S. Army doctrine, and pre-war U.S. Army doctrine. Secondary sources 
for this study will include journal articles, academic papers, and scholarly books that will 
help evaluate why or why not change occurs.  
F. OVERVIEW 
This thesis will be organized into four main chapters: an introductory chapter, a 
historical background chapter, a case study chapter, and a concluding chapter. The 
second chapter will review the Army, as an organization, and its history with 
conventional war and irregular war since World War II. The third chapter, a case study of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, will analyze the behaviors of the Army prior to the surge in 
2007 to determine if there is any evidence of a failure to anticipate, to learn from and/or 
adapt to stability operations. The final chapter will conclude with an evaluation of the 
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II. THE U.S. ARMY AND A HISTORY OF ABBERATIONS: 
NEGLECTING IRREGULAR WAR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout its history, the American military has focused the bulk of its 
attention on fighting, or preparing to fight … conventional wars, with 
circumstances dictating whether any given conflict would be total or 
limited. One trade off for this preoccupation with conventional warfare 
has been the military’s general disinclination to study and prepare for 
what, in current jargon, is referred to as stability operations.64 
~ Lawrence A. Yates, 2006 
Irregular war is not new to the United States Army, yet the organization has 
recently failed to recognize the post-invasion conflict in Iraq as irregular—instead the 
organization has continued to embrace its more successful conventional traditions and 
brushed aside its unsuccessful irregular war experience. Lawrence Yates argues: “If 
America’s armed forces have fought fewer than a dozen major conventional wars in over 
two centuries, they have, during that same period, engaged in several hundred military 
undertakings that would today be characterized as stability operations.”65 With so much 
experience in irregular warfare throughout its history, it is surprising that the Army was 
unprepared for the Iraq War in 2003 and continued to flounder about as it tried to match 
its tactics to its strategy. The Army has a history of avoiding irregular war and/or 
conflicts viewing them as aberrations, which has put the organization on the path of 
failure when it comes to such conflicts like the Iraq War and its implementation of the 
most recent type of irregular war—stability operations. Why does this avoidance happen 
within the organization? Are there characteristics about these aberrations that prevent the 
Army from wanting to conduct irregular war?  
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This chapter will focus on three of the Army’s major conventional campaigns and 
three of its irregular conflicts in recent history. World War II, the Cold War, and 
Operation Desert Storm will be reviewed to explain how the Army approved and 
supported conventional campaigns. The Korean War, Vietnam, and conflict in Somalia, 
in the 1990s, will be evaluated to demonstrate instances in how the Army disavowed 
irregular conflicts and ultimately saw them as aberrations.  
I will argue that Operation Iraqi Freedom could have been better planned and 
prepared for if the Army had placed a greater emphasis on its history with aberrations. If 
stability operations, as a form of irregular warfare, had been considered prior to the 
invasion of Iraq and/or adapted to earlier on in the war, the Army may have decreased the 
length of the war, prevented soldier deaths, and even assisted the Iraqi population earlier 
on, ultimately preventing a large insurgency that ended up growing rapidly in the first 
two years of the war.  
In addition, this chapter will use Eliot Cohen and John Gooch’s “Taxonomy of 
Misfortune” to evaluate how well the organization anticipated, learned from, and adapted 
to the threat it faced at the time.66 Further, it will try and determine if there is a 
correlation between the characteristics of the type of conflict and how the organization 
anticipated, learned, and adjusted to the conflict. 
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF “REAL WAR” AND ABBERATIONS 
Conventional campaigns, that I consider “real war,” are what the Army sees as its 
primary mission. In this chapter, we will look at conventional war as having four key 
characteristics that best define it. First, there is a clearly identified and uniformed enemy. 
Second, these campaigns are usually a state military versus another state military where 
there is a physical force on force competition against one another. Third, in conventional 
campaigns, the Army executes components of its doctrine that it has mastered—offensive  
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and defensive capabilities. Fourth, conventional campaigns have the goal of defeating the 
enemy’s military. World War II, the Cold War, and Desert Storm all have these 
characteristics within them. 
Irregular conflicts on the other hand follow different lines and have been 
considered aberrations by the Army throughout its history. First, there typically is not a 
clearly identified and uniformed enemy in these conflicts. Second, enemies often reside 
within populations and only attack when it is advantageous to them in the form of 
guerilla-style warfare. They are usually fought between a state military and a 
fundamentalist and/or politically-charged organization or organizations within another 
state. Third, the Army typically has not had a written or standard doctrine for executing 
these conflicts that typically include some combination of offensive, defensive, and 
stability operations where a balance of all three doctrines must be put into play 
simultaneously. Fourth, irregular conflicts have the goal of attempting to win over the 
population in most cases. The Vietnam War and the peacekeeping mission in Somalia are 
good examples of irregular conflicts. These are conflicts the Army was unprepared for 
that required the organization to adapt and adjust to the threat it faced in order to be 
successful. Below, in Figure 1, is a graph showing the differences between the chosen 
conflicts and the four characteristics of irregular and conventional war. 
 
Figure 1.   Characteristics of Conventional and Irregular War. 
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1. Real War: Conventional Campaigns 
The next section will go through three conventional campaigns, or “real wars,” 
and analyze each one to demonstrate how it was conventional in nature.  
a. World War II 
World War II was the epitome of a conventional war for the U.S. Army. 
The enemy was uniformed and clearly defined, the Army executed its conventional 
doctrine, the type of fight was force on force and the goal was to defeat other states 
military forces. Brian Linn argues: “World War II proved to be the Army’s finest hour. 
The defeat of Germany and Japan was a titanic military triumph, calling forth the 
service’s greatest effort since the preservation of the Union.”67 Following the end of 
World War II, the Army did not see a need to reform how it fought the war or even how 
the organization was structured. The organization instead maintained its divisional 
structure of ten divisions—keeping four divisions in Japan, five divisions in the U.S. and 
one division in Germany.68 Since the organization had won World War II there was no 
incentive or need to change the way it conducted the war. Leading into the Cold War it 
seemed as if the only real reason the Army had positioned the divisions in these locations 
was to help with reconstruction and to “hold valuable real estate” as Robert T. Davis put 
it.69 The divisions had no other purpose at the time and, in the post-war, the Army was 
doing very little to train or prepare for the next war. There was really no new doctrine 
being written—especially since the advent of the nuclear bomb seemed to make the 
Army nearly obsolete. The organization seemed to believe it had defined itself in World 
War II and there was not a need to change how the organization was operating—there 
was no need to anticipate, need to learn, or need to adapt. The organizational mentality 
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was if it is not broken, you do not need to fix it. This was the mantra that seemed to come 
about following the end of the Second World War. 
If we apply Cohen and Gooch’s model to World War II we can estimate 
that World War II was generally a success. Obviously the inability of the Armed Forces 
to anticipate the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor has to be considered a failure, but overall 
they learned from that experience and adapted to the threat. 
b. The Cold War 
The Cold War, like World War II, had a clearly defined and uniformed 
enemy: The Soviet Union. There was a clear goal to counter the Soviet military force 
economically, militarily, and through nuclear means. There was clear force on force 
standoff for over forty years between the United States Army and the Soviet military. 
Additionally, the Army had gone back to adhering to its traditional conventional war 
doctrine as it did in World War II. Although the Army did reorganize its structure to 
some degree, throughout the forty years of the campaign, it remained primarily 
conventional. Brian Linn explains how the Army remained focused conventionally: 
In the 1950s, modern warfare, in its new incarnation as atomic limited 
war, restored the army to an important if not central position in the 
nation’s defense [compared to the navy and air force]. But what began as 
an option short of all-out nuclear general war, whereby conventional 
military forces might achieve national objectives without escalation into 
mutual annihilation, soon morphed into a doctrine by which the army, 
virtually unassisted, could wage a victorious land war.70  
Two major reorganizations took place between the 1950s and 1960s, but 
neither was really innovative or changed the Army’s way of conducting war. One 
structural change occurred with the designation of the Pentomic Division under General 
Maxwell Taylor which was the Army’s attempt to adapt to the new nuclear threat.71 
Another was the designation of the Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) in 
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the 1960s.72 Both of these were simply reorganizations of the Army, but no new 
capabilities were discovered or learned. The Army did not reform its method of doing 
business—it just changed how the organization looked when conducting operations. 
The Pentomic division reorganized the Army from operating in a 17,000 
man divisional structure in World War II to a force near 12,000.73 Essentially, all the 
same forces were still there, but they were spread out in order to counter a nuclear attack. 
The 101st Airborne Division was one of the first units to undergo this reorganization and 
struggled to support the new design logistically. “The division could not function, or even 
supply itself, except as part of a larger corps organization,” explains Brian Linn.74  
In the 1960s, the Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) was 
created. These divisions had three brigade headquarters with two to five maneuver 
battalions each and they could be task organized based on the mission. It allowed the 
force to be more flexible, but again, this was just a reorganization of the same 
conventional force the Army had always known. The U.S. Army during the Cold War 
prepared to fight the Soviet Union in the same conventional manner it fought 
World War II. 
The Army organization following World War II was consumed with the 
reorganization of the force. It was as if the organization could only anticipate another 
World War II and did not seem to look left or right at other potential conflicts it may face 
in the future. Although the Cold War never transpired into World War III, the Army was 
continually preparing for the prospect that another conventional war may occur. 
c. Desert Storm 
Probably the most well-known confirmation of conventional warfare was 
that of Desert Storm. Brian Linn explains it best: “the Gulf War was not the first war of 
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the new millennium, but the final conflict of the last.”75 In the 1980s, toward the end of 
the Cold War, the Army had been putting its AirLand Battle doctrine into action through 
the revisions made to the 1982 Army Field Manual 100-5 Operations which placed 
greater emphasis on coordination between the Air Force and the Army. AirLand Battle 
was still a conventional doctrine, but instead of the Army operating independently, it was 
now coordinating efforts with the U.S. Air Force to achieve similar effects. When the 
Gulf War took place in January of 1991 and ended with a ground attack phase in 100 
hours, this seemed to validate the conventional warfare doctrine that the Army knew so 
well. In Iraq, there was a uniformed and identifiable enemy, an Iraqi force versus 
coalition force mission, a goal to defeat the enemy’s military, and a conventional doctrine 
in place that was executed almost flawlessly. The success of Desert Storm was so grand 
that the great victory seen around the world would become the basis for planning 
Operation Iraqi Freedom in the future. The Army in Desert Storm went into battle 
believing that by adding the Air Force and joint coordination into the fight that it had 
mastered the wars the organization was supposed to fight. Just like with World War II 
and the Cold War, the Army had changed the arrangement of the players in the war, but 
the war it was preparing for was still conventional in nature. 
d. A Taxonomy of Success? 
Since World War II, the Army was consumed with changing the way it 
was organized and in reinforcing the doctrine it believed it was supposed to fight. 
Although the Pentomic division, the ROAD division, and the addition of the U.S. Air 
Force changed the structure of the force, the Army was still enthralled with fighting a war 
like that of World War II where conventional tactics dominated the organization’s 
strategy. The three examples in this section demonstrate the Army’s continued desire to 
seek out and fight using conventional doctrine. There was no need to learn from the 
previous war because the organization had won the previous war. There was no need to 
anticipate a different kind of war because the greatest war the world had ever seen had 
just been won by the U.S. Army. There was no need to adapt to a new kind of war 
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because conventional wars were what the Army saw as what mattered. In these cases, the 
Army would likely contend that any other way of war was simply a sideshow that 
distracted the organization from doing what it considered, was “real war.” 
2. Aberrations: Irregular Conflicts 
The next section will go through three irregular conflicts, or “aberrations,” and 
analyze each one to demonstrate how it was irregular in nature. These conflicts were ones 
the Army was unprepared for and struggled to adjust to as they transpired. 
a. Korean War 
The first aberration is the Korean conflict in the 1950s. This aberration in 
the 1950s was much different from Vietnam and Somalia because this conflict had a 
uniformed enemy, a goal to defeat a military force, and was a force on force fight. 
However, like Vietnam and Somalia, the organization did not utilize the right doctrine for 
the conflict and the Army was unprepared. The communist-led campaign forced both 
South Korea and the United States to get involved in a static defense fight they were 
unprepared for.  
Before getting involved in the Korean conflict, the Army was trying to 
determine what was next for the organization following World War II while downsizing 
and conducting postwar reconstruction in Germany and Japan. After World War II, the 
Army’s budget was cut and manpower decreased from $8 million dollars in 1945 to only 
$700,000 dollars in 1950.76 Further deepening the difficulty of the Korean War was that 
the Army was caught off guard by the conflict—it did not expect to be going back to war 
so soon and it was unprepared for the irregular way of war it would get involved in—a 
prolonged static defense. 
In July 1950, Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith, commander of 1st 
Battalion, 21st Infantry regiment in the 24th Infantry Division first fought the North 
Koreans for two weeks and eventually withdrew after being replaced by the 1st Cavalry 
                                                 
76 Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War, 153. 
 23 
Division and having taken heavy casualties.77 Roy Flint argues, “The tactical defeats 
endured by the officers and men of the 24th [Infantry] Division were rooted in the failure 
of the Army … to prepare itself during peacetime for battle.”78 Eventually General 
Douglas MacArthur, who was conducting postwar reconstruction in Japan would come to 
the aid of South Korea but he, too, had units that were not at full strength, were not 
preparing for another war, and were in poor condition.79 “When the front began to 
stabilize in 1951, the Korean War became a war of attrition, with each side launching 
limited attacks to destroy enemy personnel,” and “Many observers compared this phase 
of the Korean War to the artillery and trench struggles of World War I” explains 
Jonathon House.80 Korea became an aberration because the Army was not prepared for a 
static defense battle in 1951. Eventually, the U.S. did learn and adapt to the fight through 
its use of air assets and heavy rapid-fire weaponry. “A defending infantry company often 
had up to a dozen machine guns above its normal authorization,” House explains.81 After 
the Korean conflict ended the Army went right back to preparing for war with the Soviet 
Union—using conventional World War II doctrine and not much was done about 
integrating air assets. It would not be until Vietnam that the use of air assets would come 
up again.  
b. Vietnam War 
Vietnam was an aberration, too. The Army chose to forget this war in its 
past because it fumbled through it for many years. The enemy in this war was hard to find 
and the doctrine at the time did not support the counterinsurgency fight the Army was 
encountering. The Army had reverted to its conventional tactics learned in World War II 
and focused on defeating the enemy instead of winning the population, which is what 
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counterinsurgency doctrine requires.82 Army Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency 
states: “Successful conduct of COIN operations depends on thoroughly understanding the 
society and culture within which they are being conducted. Soldiers and Marines must 
understand …the population…” Brian Linn argues: “Vietnam nearly broke the Army. So 
deep was the bitterness, and so broad the Army’s internal problems, that in the decade 
after 1972 the institution all but denied responsibility for defeat.”83 According to 
Lawrence Yates: 
Vietnam was a limited conventional war against regular forces; in other 
respects it was a guerilla war; and in still other respects, it was an exercise 
in … stability operations and nation building. American troops were most 
effective when fighting conventionally. Counterinsurgency activities fared 
less well.84 
The end of the draft, the erosion of discipline, and lots of drug use 
contributed to the downfall of the Army in the Vietnam conflict. In addition it can be 
argued that the Army’s unpreparedness for an irregular conflict contributed to the 
organization’s downfall. The Army would eventually acknowledge its need for change, 
but it would still end up reverting to the conventionalism it had mastered in World War II 
despite the losses and struggle the Army faced in Vietnam. 
Following the end of Vietnam, leaders like General William Depuy, 
General Creighton Abrams, and General Donn Starry established the Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to establish a “doctrinally based Army … emphasizing 
realistic training.”85 In the mid-1970s, General Depuy developed and helped write the 
1976 Army Field Manual 100-5 Operations in order to get the Army all thinking one way 
and in a new way following Vietnam, however, that new way was called “active defense” 
and it was still conventional. Even more troubling was that General Depuy based the 
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manual off his own experience in World War II and that of the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict 
instead of the lessons of Vietnam. His method of using an “active defense” focused 
heavily on attacking from a defensive posture in order to be able to strike first against an 
enemy. His method was not all that innovative in that he only reinforced the defense 
aspect of warfare—it was still a conventional doctrine by design.  
c. Somalia 
The peacekeeping operation in Somalia in the 1990s can also be 
considered an aberration the Army chose to forget. The Army initially went into Somalia 
in 1992 in order to attempt to provide humanitarian assistance to a suffering population. 
Initially, the United States Marines, under Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, 
successfully went in with overwhelming force while the United Nations moved into the 
area. After the United Nations took control, a small contingent of U.S. Army Rangers and 
Special Forces were left behind to assist in securing the area. In October of 1993, two 
Blackhawk helicopters were shot down over Mogadishu and 18 U.S. servicemen were 
killed in an irregular urban fight against an enemy that was disguised as civilians. Brian 
Linn argues: “The Somalia intervention of 1993–1994, a particularly harsh experience, 
revealed significant flaws in the Army’s post-Cold War world.”86 Linn eludes to the 
Army losing the fight in Mogadishu because the organization had trained and prepared 
for a fight against the Soviet Union—with a uniformed enemy, that was force on force, in 
a conventional fight with the goal of defeating the military. Somalia was nothing like 
that. Here the Army faced an enemy within the civilian population, guerilla warfare, in an 
irregular fight in urban terrain, with no clear objective other than to survive. Somalia, like 
Vietnam and Korea, was an aberration and the Army just wanted to forget about this 
failure like it had all the aberrations previous. 
d. A Taxonomy of Failure? 
The previous three cases highlighted the Army’s avoidance to change. In 
all of the above cases, using Eliot Cohen and John Gooch’s “Taxonomy of Misfortune” 
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we can see the organization’s failure to anticipate the threat it faced. In Korea, the Army 
did not anticipate static defense warfare. In Vietnam, the Army did not anticipate facing a 
guerilla force in a counterinsurgency fight. In Somalia, the Army did not anticipate the 
irregular fight it encountered in the streets of Mogadishu. All three cases demonstrate the 
organization’s failure to learn since the Korean War. In each of the aforementioned 
conflicts a new way of fighting battle came about, but none was ever truly integrated into 
the organizations practice and doctrine. In each case, the Army remained focused on 
conventional tactics, seeking only to add to the existing doctrine instead of innovating it. 
Adaptation of new doctrine and operating procedures seemed to elude the Army since the 
Korean War. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
The Army’s desire to turn away from its Korean War and Vietnam War 
experiences [or aberrations] is symptomatic of this tendency to selectively 
use the past to look ahead. If past experience is used too exclusively, the 
Army runs the danger of forgetting that full-spectrum capabilities call for 
a full appreciation of its own variegated history.87 
       ~ Robert T. Davis II, 2000 
 
The Army’s history of viewing irregular war as aberrations has set the Army up 
for failure. It should be no surprise that this was the case leading into Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. When looking at the cases of Somalia, Vietnam and Korea, the Army seems to 
oppose fighting wars that do not adhere to the typical conventional tradition—heavy on 
the offense and defense and light on the irregular warfare. This stubbornness of the 
organization to acknowledge the importance of the irregular wars that were not as 
successful has inhibited the Army in fighting future irregular wars.  
In Figure 2, a chart is laid out with the “real wars” on the left column and the 
“aberrations” on the right column. Using Cohen and Gooch’s “Taxonomy of Misfortune” 
and applying it to each type of conflict, one can see the general issues that come with the 
aberrations. First, a failure to anticipate the threat is prevalent in each irregular war listed. 
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Second, in none of the aberrations listed was there a complete success of anticipation, 
learning, or adapting. On the other hand, in “real war” or conventional war, anticipating 
the threat is more common because this is the type of war that the Army has chosen to 
recognize as important to prepare for. Chapter III will delve deeper into this format 
breaking Cohen and Gooch’s categories down further when discussing Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. 
 
Figure 2.   Evaluation of U.S. Army Experience With Conventional War Vs.  
Irregular Conflict, 1941–2003. 
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III. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 2003–2007: THE EVIDENCE 
OF FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT STABILITY OPERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to evaluate the Army and its implementation of stability operations in 
Iraq, looking particularly at the timeframe from the ending of major combat operations in 
Iraq in 2003 to the Army’s execution of “the surge” in 2007, this study will apply Eliot 
Cohen and John Gooch’s “Taxonomy of Misfortune” to see if a failure to anticipate, a 
failure to learn, and a failure to adapt have caused the Army to fail to implement the 
stability operations component of its counterinsurgency doctrine. The focus will be the 
period between 2003 and 2007, because this was the period following the invasion and 
leads up to the surge. This is the period where the Army organization struggled heavily to 
find the right way to fight in Iraq. 
1. Why Iraq? 
The Middle East and North Africa nations are each unique, however, they all tend 
to suffer from the similar internal conflicts such as: unemployment of middle aged males, 
they have weak institutional support of services infrastructure, are lacking in civil 
services, and generally have poor overall governance. Since these infrastructures are so 
damaged and are not in place, it is logical to predict that the United States will face 
similar problems in the region in the years to come. Since stability operations seeks “to 
establish security, to establish civil control, restore essential services, provide support to 
governance, and to provide support to economic and infrastructure development,” this 
sort of mission becomes increasingly important in the region. If the United States is to get 
involved in another country in this region, stability operations could easily become the 
military’s primary mission—especially for land forces. This then requires the Army 




senior commander to the lowest soldier on the ground. Iraq becomes particularly 
important because it is the most recent testing ground for how the Army did or did not 
implement stability operations.  
B. TEST: A FAILURE TO ANTICIPATE? 
Eliot Cohen and John Gooch explain that, “the essence of a failure to anticipate is 
not ignorance of the future, for that is inherently unknowable. It is rather, the failure to 
take reasonable precautions against a known hazard.”88 Using the example of the 1973 
Yom Kippur War, they argue that the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) failed to anticipate 
because of an inability to see the bigger picture. They write that the IDF suffered from a 
“failure to think through the many dimensions of a changing strategic challenge. By 
confining their implicit net assessment to only one level of military effectiveness—
essentially, the tactical dimension of warfare—and by failing to gauge the cumulative 
impact of change, the IDF set itself up for a calamity.”89 Cohen and Gooch explain that it 
was “reckless overconfidence” and “a brash faith in the capabilities of large all-tank 
formations” that blinded the IDF’s ability to anticipate Arab maneuvers like the execution 
of their deception plan that secretly put 20,000 Egyptians in a position to attack the 
IDF.90 The IDF did not anticipate the Arab capabilities correctly in the Yom Kippur War 
which was a major setback at the onset of the conflict, but in the end the IDF was able to 
adapt which helped it overcome its failure to anticipate.  
In Iraq, evidence suggests that the Army failed to anticipate the requirements the 
organization would be faced with. A failure to anticipate the right conditions on the 
ground, the correct number of troops necessary, prison requirements and a common way 
of war seem to demonstrate that the Army did not anticipate a stability operations fight.  
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1. Anticipating the Correct Ground Conditions 
The Army failed to anticipate the correct conditions on the ground prior to the 
invasion. Following the successful invasion of Iraq, the Army found itself unprepared for 
the fight that would follow the end of major combat operations declared by President 
Bush on May 1st, 2003. General Tommy Franks, the Commander of U.S. Central 
Command, established a four phase operational plan that concluded with a post-combat 
operations phase, however, Franks didn’t see the post-combat operation phase as a 
military responsibility—he saw it as a State Department responsibility.91  He felt that the 
final phase should be led by civilians and, therefore, did not spend much time focusing 
his efforts on post-combat missions. Franks hastily anticipated Desert Storm II and 
seemed to take little interest in focusing his efforts beyond the combat portion of the 
invasion.  
Three poor assumptions were made by the Army organization that affected the 
poor preparation of post-conflict Iraq. First, the military campaign was expected to be 
able to produce a stable security environment where troop numbers would be reduced 
from 145,000 to around 30,000 or 40,000 troops by fall of 2003.92  Second, it was 
assumed that the U.S. would be welcomed by the Iraqi people with open arms.93  Third, it 
was assumed that the extent of assistance the population would need would reside in 
providing humanitarian aid, but this also was not the case.94  As was discovered 
following major combat operations in Iraq, there was large anti-U.S. sentiment among the 
population that the Army did not anticipate. Vice President Dick Cheney wrongfully 
predicted three days before the invasion into Iraq that the U.S. “will be greeted as 
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liberators.”95 Additionally, the population was not dispersed with refugees running about 
as the U.S expected. Since combat operations lasted only three weeks, people never had a 
chance to flee their homes. These three wrongful assumptions about post-conflict Iraq 
demonstrate a failure of the Army to anticipate conditions on the ground following the 
invasion. 
2. Anticipating Troop Requirements  
The Army was only partially successful at anticipating the correct number of 
troops required for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Army Chief of Staff, General Erik Shinseki 
anticipated that the ground force for Operation Iraqi Freedom would require “several 
hundred thousand” troops.96 This was based on a ratio of one soldier for every 50 Iraqis. 
Shinseki had learned that this would be the best number based on his experience in 
Bosnia in the 1990s. Thomas Ricks writes, “[Shinseki] knew from experience that you 
needed to dominate and control the environment.”97 Additionally, the Army’s Center for 
Military History recommended a force of 260,000 troops would be necessary for post war 
Iraq if it was to try and attempt a post-World War II Germany scenario.98 Shinseki’s 
recommendation was unpopular with civilian leaders and was not accepted by the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense under Donald Rumsfeld who was seeking to send in only as 
many troops as would be necessary to defeat Iraqi forces.  
Retired General Colin Powell, the Secretary of State in 2003, emphasized that the 
military should only get involved when there is a definite national security threat and 
only as an absolute last resort and when it goes in it should go in full force with 
everything it has.99 According to Powell, there also had to be a defined exit strategy. 
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Richard Armitage, the deputy Secretary of State said that it seemed as if the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, was trying to disavow Powell’s Doctrine.100  
Some leaders in the Army, like Erik Shinseki, did anticipate a more appropriate 
number of troops that would be required to take on a long term mission. The estimations 
were based on the irregular mission NATO had faced in Bosnia where multiple factions 
of the population were at odds with one another. In the end, the invasion force into Iraq 
consisted of only 145,000 troops (65,000 of which came from the Army) from the 101st 
Airborne Division, 3rd Infantry Division, 173rd Airborne Brigade and 82nd Airborne 
Divisions.101  Even though leaders like Shinseki and Powell were questioning senior 
leaders planning the invasion, their fight did not put forth a strong enough effort because 
in the end, the troop numbers were not enough as the Army eventually learned.  
3. Anticipating Prison Requirements  
The Army failed at anticipating the requirements necessary to manage detainees 
and prisons in Iraq. Following the invasion mass numbers of prisoners were being 
detained by the Army and other forces on the ground. Abu Ghraib Prison quickly went 
over capacity within the first six months of post-combat operations. By September 2003, 
the Abu Ghraib held 3,500 prisoners.102 There also was no plan for reintegrating 
prisoners into society since there was no judicial system in place. So as Army divisions 
rounded up military aged males, they were being sent to a prison that could hardly handle 
the load they were receiving. Thomas Ricks writes in his book Fiasco, “There was never 
supposed to be a problem with detainees, because there weren’t supposed to be any, at 
least in U.S. hands. The war plan had called for the Iraqi population to cheerfully greet 
the American liberators.”103 The Army failed to anticipate just how severe the prisoner 
round up would be. This eventually led to detainee abuses in January 2004 which both 
                                                 
100 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 102. 
101 Ibid., 117. 
102 Ibid., 199. 
103 Ibid., 290. 
 34 
hurt the Army’s image, but also demonstrated to the United States that the Army was not 
as prepared as it was thought to have been. 
4. Anticipating a Common Way of War 
The Army failed to identify a strategy and method for executing that strategy. 
Two Army divisions in 2003 to 2004 under two different commanders each ran their 
divisions and their stability operations with the absence of specific doctrinal guidance. 
General Raymond Odierno of the 4th Infantry Division and General David Petreaus of the 
101st Airborne Division each attempted to deal with post-invasion Iraq in their own ways. 
Petreaus took on northern Iraq by working with the local population. He coordinated with 
local sheiks and leaders and there seemed to be no gap starting from the end of the 
invasion to post-conflict operations as was felt in many parts of Iraq. Petreaus wrote a list 
of fourteen observations including: “help build institutions, not just units; ultimate 
success depends on local leaders; and act quickly because every Army of liberation has a 
half-life.”104 Petreaus incorporated the Iraqi leadership in Mosul by establishing a civic 
council that served as an interim ad hoc government. 
General Raymond Odierno was a different style of leader. Petreaus was the sort of 
officer who vetted twenty-five captured military age males and sent three to prison while 
Odierno’s unit would send all twenty-five.105  The 4th Infantry Division was more 
aggressive than the 101st Airborne Division. They were responsible for the Sunni 
Triangle in 2003 and 2004, which had a history of being a difficult spot. “Odierno’s 
brigades and battalions earned a reputation for being overly aggressive,” writes Ricks.106  
The lack of a consistent way of operating in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 was directly 
due to Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the theater commander, and his poor 
leadership. General Sanchez’s laissez-faire leadership contributed to the two units 
operating independently. Ricks writes, “The American offensive was undone by a 
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combination of overwhelmed soldiers and indiscriminate generals—especially the 4th 
Infantry Division’s Odierno, who sent too many detainees south, and his immediate 
superior, Sanchez, who should have seen this and stopped it.”107 The 101st Airborne 
Division and 4th Infantry Division going their own way is another example that 
demonstrates that the Army, as an organization, did not anticipate what kind of fight the 
divisions and lower components would be taking on. This is probably the most significant 
failure of all of the four failures to anticipate in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Army did 
not have a stability operations doctrine to guide it after the invasion ended. General 
Petreaus said it best: “The insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan were not, in truth, the 
wars for which we were best prepared in 2001; however, they are the wars we are 
fighting and they clearly are the kind of wars we must master.”108 
5. Results 
Based on the four tests above, it is apparent that the Army did not anticipate what 
it encountered in Iraq. Had the Army placed a greater emphasis on stability operations 
prior to 2003, the organization could have been better prepared for the conditions, prison 
requirements, troop requirements, and would have had a more standardized way of 
operating in Iraq. Although stability operations were not identified as important until 
2005 in DoD Directive 3000.05, the Army should have expected a longer, drawn out, 
peace operations-style conflict similar to that of Bosnia.109  
C. TEST: A FAILURE TO LEARN? 
The next section asks the question, was there an organizational failure to learn in 
Iraq? Eliot Cohen and John Gooch explain, “like people and businesses, armed forces 
suffer misfortune when they fail to learn obvious lessons.”110 They further state: 
                                                 
107 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 261. 
108 David Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations From Soldiering in Iraq.” Military 
Review. (Jan.-Feb. 2006): 45. 
109 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Direction 3000.05: Stability Operations, 
November 2005. 
110 Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War, 25. 
 36 
“Although we expect individuals to fall ready victims to this syndrome, whether because 
of mental inadequacy or blind carelessness, we do not expect sophisticated organizations 
to do the same.”111 Cohen and Gooch use the American antisubmarine warfare (ASW) in 
1942 to explain how the U.S. Navy organization failed to learn from the Royal Navy 
experience despite having had access before the war about antisubmarine warfare.112 
In Iraq, the Army seems to have failed to learn how important the stability 
operations aspect of counterinsurgency was. Failures to learn to focus on population, to 
include non-lethal tactics in between deployments and to learn from junior leaders on the 
ground who had experiences with the local population seem to have evaded the Army 
organization.  
1. Learning to Focus on the Population 
The Army failed to learn from its dealings with the local population. In 
counterinsurgency, the primary goal is the population and the Army organization did not 
understand that from the very beginning. High casualty rates forced the Army to look 
within and reassess how it was conducting the war. Under the leadership of General 
Ricardo Sanchez, the Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7) Commander, 
counterinsurgency was not really a consideration. The Army was still trying to fight a 
conventional war in 2003 and into 2004. It was not until General George Casey came in 
to replace Sanchez in August 2004 that the Army began to change how it fought the war 
on the ground. Casey did two key things to try and implement a refocus of Army strategy 
in Iraq. First, he developed the Counterinsurgency (COIN) Academy at Camp Taji, just 
north of Baghdad. Second, he established a universal campaign plan that was classified as 
a way to provide direction to military commanders on the ground. The COIN Academy 
was a way to try to get leaders to understand what COIN was and how it should be 
fought. Although Casey was able to get a hold of the steering wheel of a runaway car 
going down the road, he was still driving in the wrong direction.  
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In counterinsurgency, the target is the population so in order to reach out and 
understand that population one would assume you must be among it. Casey’s strategy 
was slightly different. He decided to get the soldiers out of the cities and took a defensive 
posture by having troops move into large Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) to conduct 
patrols from large protected fortresses. His theory was to leave the population to their 
own devices while rebuilding the Iraqi Army from the ground up. By doing this, he only 
alienated the population both physically and psychologically. Casey’s defensive 
counterinsurgency strategy did not get after the true goal of COIN which is the 
population. Despite having a campaign plan and a new training school in Taji, the Army 
still suffered from increasing attacks. In 2004, the Army took approximately 24,000 
casualties and by the end of 2005, had taken on around 34,000 casualties.113 
2. Learning New Tactics Between Deployments 
The Army failed to learn new tactics between deployments in Iraq. The Center for 
Army Lessons Learned (CALL) did start analyzing after action reports from combat 
leaders in Iraq and began publishing pamphlets with key lessons and takeaways from 
Iraq. Additionally, the Army sent General David Petreaus in 2005 to Fort Leavenworth to 
the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) where he made studying 
counterinsurgency mandatory for all students there.114 General Petreaus also wrote an 
article in Military Review in 2005 where he used his experience with the 101st Airborne 
Division in Mosul to explain how COIN should be done. 115 Lessons were beginning to 
be addressed at these senior and scholarly levels of the Army, but the main force was still 
spending only twelve months in between deployments. 
Because units would only return for twelve months at a time, there was very little 
opportunity to introduce new doctrine or to change tactics. Not until 2006 would Army 
Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency be published explaining how the regular Army 
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should fight in Iraq. Until that manual was published, Army general purpose force units 
continued to train and prepare the best ways they knew how by focusing on offense and 
defensive strategies. Units in between deployments would prepare for Improvised 
Explosive Device (IED) attacks, small arms fire, mortar attacks, and small raids—all 
missions focused on the offensive and defensive capabilities of the Army. The 
organization was still very conventionally focused through 2006. Once Field Manual 3-
24 Counterinsurgency came out, it would still take time for the new doctrine to make its 
way down to the soldier holding the rifle engaging the civilian population on his or her 
next tour. 
All in all, the Army leadership was learning that it needed to relook its tactical 
employment of counterinsurgency between 2003 and 2006, however, the general purpose 
force was still preparing for the conventional war it wanted. The Center for Army 
Lessons Learned made great strides to reform the tactical Army, but these strides 
remained focused on offensive and defensive tactics—stability operations was still not 
being discussed. 
3. Learning To Use Money as a Weapon System  
In 2004, the Department of Defense created the Commander’s Emergency 
Response Program (CERP), which gave Army unit commanders authority to manage 
financial capital to improve economic stability in Iraq. Since 2004, the Army had been 
the lead agent in not only combating the insurgency, but also contributing to the 
rehabilitation of a broken essential service infrastructure using CERP. The program was 
managed by Army junior officers and was randomly audited and evaluated by the 
Department of Defense and Government Accountability Office. The program put 
financial capital directly into the Iraqi economy through the hands of local Iraqi civilian 
contractors via written contracts with the Army for the purpose of rehabilitating broken 
state infrastructures. The Army managed these numerous reconstruction projects over the 
tenure of their deployments, using dedicated officers such as a Contracting Officer (KO) 
at a regional level and a Project Purchasing Officer (PPO) at the lower levels of Army 
structure. As the Army conducted relief in place procedures in Iraq, PPOs handed off 
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oversight of these contracted projects to the incoming unit PPO in an attempt to provide 
contract continuity with the Iraqi contactor.  
The CERP program was designed to satisfy immediate needs and help the Army 
earn a positive rapport with the civilian population by giving the Army the capability to 
directly input funds into the local economy. The notion of “winning the hearts and 
minds” became a common understanding among Army personnel when using CERP 
funds in Iraq.116 Since the enemy threat typically resided within the population, there was 
an ever growing need to know the population and learn from them. The CERP program 
was generally seen by the Army as another weapon system that could help locate and find 
the enemy within a population by earning the trust of that population. This is why it 
became known as “money as a weapon system.”117  
Projects executed between 2004 and 2007 were typically not coordinated or 
integrated. Although the population benefited from these projects, many went 
uncompleted or were redone in many instances because the Army failed to coordinate 
internally with other agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development, 
U.S. State Department or U.S. Army Corps of Engineers who were also conducting 
independent projects in Iraq. Further compounding reconstruction efforts was the fact that 
the Army did not understand the Iraqi infrastructure. Junior officers were putting in new 
water pumps, building roads, and starting trash collection programs which provided 
immediate benefit to the population. Once these projects were completed, however, many 
were never integrated into the existing budgets and institutions within Iraq. As a result, 
many projects failed or were forgotten because once they were completed no money 
existed to keep them operating. The failure to learn to coordinate between U.S. agencies 
in Iraq and the failure to learn to integrate projects into the existing Iraqi institutions only 
complicated the counterinsurgency fight. For example, when a water pump project would 
build a pump for a local village, that pump would require gas to run the generator which 
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ran the pump. Since Army contracts, through the Commander’s Emergency Response 
Program, had finite funds once the money ran out, the locals could not pay for the 
additional gas to run the pump. Since that pump was built with U.S. Taxpayer dollars 
through the Army, the Provincial Iraqi Government or even local Iraqi Director General 
would not be obligated to provide fuel for that pump. This only complicated the 
infrastructure the coalition was trying to rehabilitate.  
Although the Army was conducting projects as a way to build trust with the 
population, it was doing so ineffectively. Had it more closely considered stability 
operations from the very beginning, the learning curve would have been less 
conspicuous. 
4.  Results 
In conclusion, the Army had both failed to learn some lessons and had been 
successful in learning others between 2003 and 2007. The Army began to see that it 
needed to change its tactics for going after counterinsurgency. The Army did start to 
build trust with the Iraqi population through the CERP program in 2004, but struggled to 
coordinate and integrate projects for long-term success. Overall, the Army learned 
between 2003 and 2007 that stability operations missions were becoming the way 
forward in Iraq. 
D.  TEST: A FAILURE TO ADAPT? 
According to Cohen and Gooch, adapting is defined as “identifying and taking 
full advantage of the opportunities offered by enemy actions or by chance combinations 
of circumstances to win success or to stave off failure.”118 They use the Battle of 
Gallipoli in August 1915 to describe an example of a failure to adapt. In the battle, the 
British expeditionary commander, Ian Hamilton, failed to adjust his forces to the fight 
against Turkish forces. British ships ended up losing their way and landed troops in the 
wrong place and did not have enough supporting firepower to take on Turkish forts in an 
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amphibious assault. At Sulva Bay, one of the landing points for the British, the Turks 
were not within range of the British troops. Despite having landed early, the British 
troops were short of water, were short of artillery assets, and had poor maps of the terrain 
which all led confusion on the ground. A lack of direct leadership contributed to the 
inability of the British forces to gain ground. In the end, Turkish forces were able to 
surround the British and reinforce at Sulva Bay before they ever advanced. A major 
opportunity was lost in this battle because the British Army was unable to adapt on the 
ground and to adapt quickly to the enemy and conditions.  
In counterinsurgency, the force that adapts the fastest to the enemy usually has the 
upper hand. Iraq was a true testing ground for the Army to see if it had what it took to 
adapt to a changing enemy. In stability operations, non-lethal tactics and non-lethal 
experts such as civil affairs and civil military operations are necessary. Additionally, in 
order to gauge the success of stability operations, which is less tangible than defense and 
offense operations, having concrete standard measures of effectiveness are important for 
accessing progress. 
1.  Adapting to New Nonlethal Tactics 
The Army was successful eventually at adapting to new non-lethal tactics in Iraq. 
In late 2005, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) experienced counterinsurgency 
success in Tall Afar. Colonel H.R. McMaster took command of his unit before going into 
Iraq in 2005 and stressed to his people that winning the population is winning the 
counterinsurgency fight.119 He also trained his unit to not use the derogatory term “haji” 
with the Iraqis and had many of his soldiers go through a three-week training session on 
Arabic language.120 Rather than go in full force in Tall Afar, McMaster took his time 
learning the population, identifying enemy strongholds, and working with the Iraqi police 
and army to help coordinate security and to keep the population calm. He only attacked 
after months of preparation and learning. McMaster’s implementation of stability  
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operations aspects of counterinsurgency in Tall Afar was noticed briefly in 2005 by 
some, but most of the Army continued to press forward with the offensive and defensive 
tactics they knew. 
The example of the Colonel McMaster of the 3rd ACR in Tall Afar and the 
example of General David Petreaus when he commanded the 101st Airborne Division in 
Mosul are two examples of the Army adapting to an unknown situation on the ground 
and being successful at it. To date, Colonel McMaster’s success is revered by many 
officers in the Army. Colonel McMaster eventually went on to work with General David 
Petreaus in 2007 and 2008 during “the surge” in Iraq primarily due to his success in Tall 
Afar. 
2.  Adapting New Standard Measures of Effectiveness  
The Army did fail to adapt new measures of effectiveness. Measures of 
effectiveness have evaded the Army with regards to understanding the population. 
Between 2003 and 2007, most of the measures of effectiveness that units were using were 
ad hoc and made up because no Army manual existed to give them guidance on just how 
to measure success in Iraq. Dr. Pauline Baker pointed out the deficiency her 2007 
Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) Manual stating: “Military forces also have 
their own measures of effectiveness, but they focus on military benchmarks or 
operational outputs, not societal outcomes.”121 Her manual written in 2007 clearly 
demonstrates the difficulty the military had addressing “societal outcomes.”  Again, if the 
purpose of counterinsurgency is to target the people, the military has to measure how 
effective its tactics are in achieving that goal. One way to do that is by setting 
benchmarks that evaluate the society, but this had not been the case in Iraq. In 2006, 
Craig Cohen discussed this problem: 
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Within the U.S. government, efforts to measure progress have not yet been 
sufficiently integrated into overall mission planning… While the U.S. 
military, Department of Defense, State Department, and U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) are actively engaged in measuring 
aspects of reconstruction progress in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, 
they typically focus on measuring programmatic performance rather than 
offering an integrated assessment of a country’s overall progress toward 
stabilization and reconstruction.122 
The United States Army has the capability to reach more people quicker 
compared to other agencies within the Department of Defense. If the Army cannot 
successfully assess the country’s progress which includes the population, than how can 
we expect it to truly be able to achieve counterinsurgency success? In this instance, the 
Army failed to adapt to Iraq between 2003 and 2007. Although CERP projects and 
reconstruction efforts were taking place, there had been no standardized measure of 
effectiveness put in place that assessed the population within Iraq. 
3. Adapting Personnel to Stability Operations  
The Army did adapt its personnel effectively to conduct stability operations 
missions. Thomas Ricks wrote in Fiasco: “Civil Affairs officers, whose job it is to work 
with local populations, clashed frequently with commanders of units they were supposed 
to support because of the different imperatives they faced, with little direction from 
higher levels of command.”123 Civil Affairs personnel are few and far between within the 
active Army. To date, there is only one active duty Army brigade that does civil affairs 
and its ownership belongs to the United States Special Operations Command out of Fort 
Bragg, North Carolina. The unit has 1,200 personnel.124 The remaining 12,000 Civil 
Affairs personnel come from the reserve components of the Army and were attached only 
in times of war to general purpose forces.125 No prior training or coordination between 
                                                 
        122 Cohen, Craig. “Measuring Progress and Stabilization and Reconstruction,” Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Series, USIP Press. (Washington, DC, Mar. 2006): 3-4. 
123 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 225. 
124 United States Army Special Operations Command. 95th Civil Affairs Brigade. Fact sheet. 
http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20pages/95th%20CAB.html (accessed 15 MAR 11). 
125 United States Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), Fact sheet. 
http://www.usacapoc.army.mil/facts-capoc.html (accessed 15 MAR 11). 
 44 
these reservist Civil Affairs personnel ever took place before units deployed to Iraq. 
Some units may have trained with a Civil Affairs Team during their unit certification at 
Fort Polk, Louisiana or Fort Irwin, California, but that was not always the case. 
Between 2003 and 2007, most general purpose force divisions were given a Civil 
Affairs (CA) battalion and most brigades were given a Civil Affairs company. These 
experts were then sliced out into 4-person teams for general purpose force battalions.126  
If the average size of a battalion is about 600 soldiers and there is only one 4-person Civil 
Affairs team for those 600 soldiers, there is not enough expertise on the ground. If the 
population was the priority, the Army needed more “population experts” on the ground. 
Despite the lack of personnel, however, the Army did begin to adapt. Junior 
officers were eventually tagged within units to serve as ad hoc Information Operations 
officers as well as Civil Military Operations (CMO) Officers. Battalions, like 1-32 
Cavalry Squadron in the 101st Airborne Division in 2005 and 2006 in Diyala Province, 
established ad hoc Civil Military Operations Officers who began to take on larger roles as 
the need for stability operations expertise became increasingly important to the 
counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq.127 Typically these CMO Officers would take on the 
role of Project Purchasing Officer for the CERP program as previously was discussed and 
would be responsible for dealing with claims made against the U.S., helping employ local 
workers for FOBs, and more. The difficulty with creating ad hoc staff positions is that not 
every unit had the same caliber of officer and of these officers many often lacked formal 
training in Civil Military Operations.  
Even though the Army adapted to its counterinsurgency fight by creating CMO 
Officers it lacked a permanent and established cadre of stability operations officers who 
were educated, trained, and experienced in dealing with local populations similar to the 
Army’s existing Civil Affairs officers.  
                                                 
126 United States Army Headquarters, Field Manual 3-05.40: Civil Affairs Operations. September 
 2006. 
127 Based on author's experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom between 2005–2006. 
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4.  Results 
To conclude, the Army organization did a solid job adapting between 2003 and 
2007. In 2005, Colonel McMasters successfully executed a counterinsurgency operation 
with little experience and having no written doctrine to guide his actions. The Army also 
established ad hoc positions to take on roles such as Civil Military Operations Officer and 
Information Operations officer to help in dealing with the population. One aspect the 
Army did not expand upon was its establishment of measures of effectiveness to help 
assess the population. 
E.  FINDINGS 
Based on the above results, Figure 3 is a chart that breaks down the findings of 
each component to Cohen and Gooch’s model into three categories: success, partial 
success, and failure.  
 
Figure 3.   Evaluation of Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2003–2007 and Stability 
Operations Implementation. 
Overall, the Army was partially successful as an organization between 2003 and 
2007 in Iraq in implementing stability operations. In particular, the organization failed to 
anticipate the ground conditions, prison requirements, and a common way of war. 
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Further, the organization was unable to adapt a standard measure of effectiveness to 
evaluate its performance of stability operations implementation in Iraq. 
The Army was partially successful at anticipating troop requirements. Even 
though the actual invasion force numbered only 145,000, some prewar estimates at the 
Pentagon anticipated a much larger force. 128 The initial stability operation could have 
been more effective had the larger estimates been used. It would not be until “the surge” 
in 2007 that the Army would truly have a significant impact on the security situation with 
a larger force. Additionally, the Army was only partially successful at learning to focus 
on the population, implementing new tactics, and learning to use financial capital as a 
weapon system. Each of these components did have a positive impact on stability 
operations, but they were shy of being completely effective. For instance, the use of 
financial capital was a push in the right direction in an attempt to win the “hearts and 
minds,” however, the lack of integration of projects keeps the use of financial capital in 
the partial success category. 
The greatest successes the Army had was with adapting new non-lethal tactics and 
the adaptation of untrained personnel into positions where they were able to adjust to the 
situation and become Civil Military Operations Officers to support the stability 
operations mission.  
In conclusion, the findings identify a failure to anticipate stability operations 
requirements as the primary issue with the implementation of a counterinsurgency 
strategy. Additionally, the findings also identify that the Army did learn during conflict, 
but still seemed resistant to allow itself to incorporate the lessons of implementing 
stability operations.  
 
 
                                                 
128 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 117. 
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IV. CONCLUSION: EMBRACING STABILITY OPERATIONS 
This last chapter will focus primarily on providing recommendations for the 
Army, as an organization, in its attempt to implement stability operations or any new 
irregular war doctrine in the future. This chapter will be broken into three sections of 
recommendations: a section reviewing the previous two chapters, a section on 
recommendations for the Army organization and a section of recommendations for future 
research. 
A. REVIEW OF FINDINGS 
This thesis set out to answer: Why has the Army, as an organization, had such a 
difficult time implementing stability operations? In considering this question, this thesis 
initially reviewed the Army’s history with how it has dealt with irregular conflicts versus 
conventional war in Chapter II and found that the Army has a history of failing to see 
irregular war as important as conventional war. The organization’s behavior has been to 
simply “look the other way” when it is unprepared and to continue to pursue conventional 
war preparations despite the encounter with irregular war. Additionally, in Chapter II, 
using Cohen and Gooch’s “Taxonomy of Misfortune” model, this thesis found that a 
failure to anticipate was the primary reason the Army was unprepared for irregular war. 
In Chapter III, this thesis took the case study of Operation Iraqi Freedom from 
2003–2007 and again used Cohen and Gooch’s “Taxonomy of Misfortune” model to try 
and determine what aspect of organizational failure contributed most to the Army’s 
struggle to implement stability operations. Chapter III found that the Army failed to 
implement stability operations, again, because of its failure to anticipate the irregular war 
it was entering into. Additionally it found that the Army was only partially successful at 
learning from its mistakes during the conflict as it took three years before new written 
doctrine was introduced that supported stability operations. However, on a positive note, 
Chapter III discovered that the Army was successful at eventually adapting to its 
environment over time. 
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B.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ORGANIZATION 
Overall, the Army has some work to do on improving implementation of new 
doctrine based on its recent experience in Iraq with stability operations. Looking back 
through its history, the organization should be concerned primarily with its continued 
struggle to anticipate the next fight. As Chapter II found, the Army has either chosen to 
collectively ignore irregular conflict or has been unable to see the differences between 
irregular conflict and conventional war. It also could be a combination of both. The 
following prescriptions seek to offer the Army some considerations for the future. 
1.  Anticipate More Than Just Conventional War 
First, the Army must improve its ability to anticipate the next fight—this is the 
organization’s greatest threat to success in the future. As we saw in Chapter II and 
learned in Chapter III, the organization has a history of failing to anticipate anything but 
conventional war. In the Korean War, the Army was unprepared for the static defense 
style of warfare that took place. In Vietnam, the Army was unprepared for the guerilla 
tactics of the Viet Cong and attempted to fight an insurgency with conventional tactics. In 
Somalia, the Army failed to anticipate the uprising of disingenuous tribes embedded 
within a highly populated area and ended up losing eighteen soldiers and two Blackhawk 
helicopters to warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid. In preparing for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, the Army failed to anticipate a prolonged irregular war because it was 
consumed with preparing for a second Desert Storm. The lesson here is that the Army has 
failed to prepare properly for irregular war. Whether the irregular war was a static 
defense, a guerilla-based insurgency, or an urban fight among a dense population, the 
Army has responded with conventional style tactics. The Army must move beyond the 
traditional role it embraces so easily and force itself to consider its growing non-
traditional role in irregular warfare operations in the future.  
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2.  Improve Organizational Learning 
The Army must continue to learn from its mistakes and find ways to incorporate 
change into its doctrine and training.  
The Army was partially successful at learning to incorporate the population as a 
priority in the counterinsurgency fight in Iraq. General Casey was able to steer the Army 
into a new way of fighting in 2005 with his creation of the COIN Academy training site 
in Iraq and his reorientation on helping the population through investing in training of the 
Iraqi police and Iraqi army. However, it really wasn’t until “the surge” in 2007, under 
General David Petreaus, that the Army started getting out among the population because, 
until then, the Army never had the number of soldiers it needed to be able to do so. It 
took from 2003 to 2007 for the Army to learn that in order to help the population, you 
must physically operate among the population—that is too long. 
Additionally, the Army must ensure that it attempts to train its people at all levels 
on how to implement stability operations in ways that are not “on the fly” or ad hoc. A 
Army term is “METT-T,” which stands for: Mission, Enemy, Time, Troops and Terrain 
and is used among soldiers in tactical mission planning. Since Operation Iraqi Freedom 
started soldiers have donned a new term: “METT-TC” where the “C” stands for “civilian 
considerations.”129 Although soldiers at lower echelons of the organization learned to 
incorporate “civilian considerations” into their training, it is only one small step toward 
improving the training of and learning within the organization. Upper echelon leaders 
must incorporate stability operations training into school houses within the Army. 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) must be the one to ensure stability 
operations is a priority to the force. Formalized training is longer lasting than informal ad 
hoc training among lower echelon members of the organization. Soldiers should be 
exposed to classes and courses on how to deal with populations well before ever being 
asked to deploy to a foreign country. This training also has to occur just as regularly as 
any offensive or defensive training. 
                                                 
129 Based on author's personal experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom 2005–2006 and 2007–2008. 
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3. Continue to Adapt 
The Army in Iraq did adapt better than it learned or anticipated. Through its 
establishment of ad hoc staff officers at the tactical level and its trial by fire methods by 
the 3rd ACR in Tall Afar, there is proof that the Army can adapt when it must. Between 
2003 and 2006, no written doctrine existed for commanders to reference so innovation 
from the bottom-up took place. Tactical commanders made decisions on the ground that 
were both inventive and key to changing the way the Army was fighting in Iraq. 
“Organizational innovation … manifested itself through the emergence of a series of new 
standard operating procedures that collectively resulted in fundamental changes to the 
ways in which units … fought the insurgents,” argues James Russell.130 He takes the 
point of view that soldiers innovate when they lack guidance. The Army’s creation of 
Civil Military Operations Officers (sometimes referred to as “S-9s”) was one of its 
responses to the demand to understand and incorporate civilian considerations on the 
battlefield. Because the Army was so short Civil Affairs personnel, it adapted to the need 
and was able to eventually meet the requirements of the conflict.  
The Army must continue to be able to adapt in the future to whatever mission it 
faces. As this thesis has demonstrated, the Army is good at adapting, but if the 
organization is having to adapt it is likely forcing unnecessary stress on the system. 
Additionally, it may cause confusion in the organization which can be detrimental in the 
long run. By being prepared for both conventional and irregular wars, through 
organizational anticipation and learning, the Army can avoid the stresses put on it when it 
adapts.  
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis used Eliot Cohen and James Gooch’s “Taxonomy of Misfortune” as 
the basis for analyzing Operation Iraqi Freedom from an organizational and “behaviorist” 
perspective. There is one key recommendation I would offer for future researchers and 
scholars who are interested in pursuing this topic further.  
                                                 
130 Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War, 8. 
 51 
I would recommend a greater emphasis on evaluating military organizations from 
a bottom-up approach. In much of the literature review done in Chapter I, most scholars 
tend to take a top-down approach to analyzing organizations and innovation theory. 
Adam Grissom explained in his article about military organizations and innovation that, 
“all of the major models of military innovation operate from the top down.”131 Grissom 
goes on further to explain how top down approaches take place: 
According to the major models, therefore, the senior officers and/or 
civilians are the agents of innovation. They recognize the need for change, 
formulate a new way of warfare, position their organization to seize the 
opportunity of innovation, and bludgeon, politically leverage, or culturally 
manipulate the organization into compliance.132 
When discussing some of the key scholars in the field (Deborah Avant, Barry 
Posen, and Stephen Rosen) James Russell states: “All three assume that authority flows 
down the governmental hierarchy in a reasonably predictable process…”133 Like Russell, 
I agree there is a need to look at organizations and analyze them from a bottom-up 
approach.  
D.  FINAL THOUGHTS 
President George W. Bush declared the end of major combat operations in Iraq in 
May of 2003 as he stood in front of a sign that stated “Mission Accomplished.” President 
Bush, like the Army, clearly did not know what major combat operations involved. Had 
President Bush known in 2003 that major combat operations, not just offensive and 
defensive operations, entailed long term stability operations, then maybe he would have 
asked to stand in front of a sign that said “Mission Incomplete.” As Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, now Operation New Dawn, winds down toward the end of 2011, 50,000 
soldiers continue to conduct stability operations every day. In the future, the Army may 
want to consider the advice of Michael Howard: 
                                                 
131 Grissom, 920. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Russell, 35. 
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I am temped indeed to declare that dogmatically that whatever doctrine the 
Armed Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also 
tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. 
What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment 
arrives. . . .Still it is the task of military science in an age of peace to 
prevent the doctrines from being too badly wrong.134  
Although military organizations often get doctrine wrong, there is something to be 
said for their ability to innovate without guidance at the precise moment it is needed. 
Additionally, the above quote makes sense in that as the Army enters into a period of 
lesser engagements, there is a new opportunity to pursue getting the doctrine right before 
the next conflict that arises. It remains to be seen, however, if the Army will be able to 
eventually anticipate the next irregular conflict. 
  
                                                 
134 Michael Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” RUSI, Journal of the Royal United 
Services Institute for Defence Studies (March 1974), 7. 
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